Abstract
Although John Locke was neither the first nor the last philosopher to address a problem which artists and aestheticians as well as other philosophers constantly must face, he exerted a telling influence on its history. In his Essay he observed, ‘When we set before our eyes a round globe … it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle.’1 According to David Hume, Locke was not alone in thinking that visual perception involves something two-dimensional: ‘It is commonly allowed by philosophers that all bodies which discover themselves to the eye appear as if painted on a plain surface.’2
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Notes and References
J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), J. W. Yolton, (ed.) 2 vols. (New York and London: Dent, 1961) vol. II, ch. ix, sect. 8.
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), L. A. Selby-Bigge, (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) vol. I, ch. ii, sect. 5.
R. Descartes, Philosophical Works of Descartes, tr. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955) vol. II, p. 252.
B. Spinoza, Ethics (1677), tr. A. Boyle, intro. G. Santayana (London: Dent, 1910), pt. 22, prop. XLIX, note.
T. Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), in Works, Sir William Hamilton (ed.) 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart & Co., 1846–63).
R. H. Thouless, ‘Phenomenal Regression to the “Real” Object’, British Journal of Psychology, XXI (1931), pp. 339–59.
T. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), A. D. Woozley (ed.) (London: Macmillan, 1941) abridged, Essay II, ch. 4.
L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds), tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) 548.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees (eds), tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953) I, 384.
I have discussed this elsewhere: G. Vesey, ‘Locke and Wittgenstein on Language and Reality’, in H. D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy 14th series (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976) pp. 253–73;
G. Vesey (ed.), Communication and Understanding (Brighton: Harvester, 1977) pp. ix-xxii, and have space here to give only a summary account of the difference.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) (London: Dent, 1714) ch. iv.
A. Arnauld, Treatise on True and False Ideas (1683), in Oeuvres Philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld, intro. Jules Simon (Paris: Adolphe Delahays, 1843).
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© 1991 Godfrey Norman Agmondisham Vesey
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Vesey, G. (1991). Of the Visible Appearances of Objects. In: Inner and Outer. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21639-0_10
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