Abstract
The economic analysis of political and bureaucratic institutions can productively begin with the study of bribery, not because it is necessarily pervasive but because it highlights the conflict between the public interest and the market. Widespread bribery can transform a governmental procedure ostensibly based on democratic or meritocratic principles into one based on willingness-to-pay.
Keywords
- Organize Crime
- Political Corruption
- Campaign Spending
- Perfect Competition
- Governmental Procedure
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© 1991 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Rose-Ackerman, S. (1991). Bribery. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) The World of Economics. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_2
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