Abstract
H. P. Grice in his paper ‘Meaning’ (1967)2 presents an account of meaning that does not presuppose language as its vehicle. The fundamental notion in such an account is the utterer meaning something by an audience-directed utterance on a particular occasion. The utterance can be either vocal or non-vocal — for instance, a noise or a shrug. And what is meant by an utterance having meaning is further unpacked in terms of the intention with which it was produced and is seen as being produced by the intended audience.
A version of this paper was read at the World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton, in August 1988.
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Notes
H. P. Grice, ‘Meaning’ in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic (Oxford University Press, 1967).
C. Taylor, ‘Action as Expression’ in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds), Intention and Intentionality (Brighton: Harvester, 1979).
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© 1991 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Mahalingam, I. (1991). Languageless Creatures and Communication. In: Mahalingam, I., Carr, B. (eds) Logical Foundations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21232-3_10
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