America Encounters the Subcontinent: Bilateralism and Tripolar Diplomacy

Abstract

The evolution of the Muslim League’s Lahore resolution of 1940 to become the creed of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent coincided with unprecedented and rapid developments in the West. In Europe the Nazis were occupying one state after another, the United Kingdom was in a very precarious situation and America was moving quickly toward active involvement on the side of the Allies — forsaking her early postures of ‘neutrality’ and ‘isolationism’. Pro-British sentiments increased in the USA and Roosevelt vigorously prepared the nation for more open involvement. Japanese exploits in the Far East at the expense of the Allies made Asia the second most vital war theatre for America, which had many possessions and interests in the Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines. In addition to these strategic interests, FDR had a sentimental attachment to China where the Americans had the largest missionary enterprise and visible economic interests.¹ In such a geo-political situation, Britain and her empire in the subcontinent received prompt attention from the White House, State Department, Pentagon and other defence-related agencies. American ‘political’ interest in the subcontinent arose largely from geo-strategic factors, although other factors played some part.