The Psychometric G Reconsidered

Abstract

Psychometry is openly assailed as a pseudoscience by radical critics (Layzer, 1977; Blum, 1978; Gould, 1981; Rose, Kamin and Lewontin, 1984) and might, therefore, appear to provide an important area for the attention of philosophers of science. Yet while problems of the mind/body relation, the logic of cognitive functionalism, issues of action and behaviour, and other areas are well-worked in the philosophy of psychology, the scientific status of psychometry is remarkably neglected. One obstacle, although surely not major, to the analysis of psychometric theory may be that there is, in fact, no generally accepted psychometric theory but rather a cluster of theories — ‘test and measurement’ theory, single and multiple factor theories, structure of the intellect models, and so on — presenting alternative conceptual frameworks. As the explanatory logic of psychometric, or IQ theory, has not been adequately formalised as a set of related propositions it is necessary here to outline briefly the minimal position of a viable psychometric theory of intelligence. An IQ theory which aims for explanatory power must maintain that intelligence is an inherent property of individuals; that it develops as a result of the interaction between the genetic programme and the environment; that IQ tests measure that inherent property; and that measured intelligence predicts scholastic attainment because intelligence is a functional cause of scholastic attainment.

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