Abstract
In August 1986 the Soviet government reversed its long-standing policy of opposition to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and applied to participate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Western response was both prompt and negative: United States officials ruled out Soviet entry on the grounds that the Soviet trade system was in “fundamental, practical and philosophical contradiction” to GATT rules.1
I would like to thank members of the GATT secretariat, and particularly David Hartridge and Ake Linden for help in the preparation of this chapter.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
For a summary of the extent to which Soviet, Chinese and Polish reforms have approached the liberal ideal of political, economic and social participation, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Crisis of Communism: The Paradox of Political Participation,” The Washington Quarterly 10 (Autumn 1987): 167–74.
M. M. Kostecki, East-West Trade and the GATT System ( London: Macmillan, 1979 ) pp. 2–3.
The relevant section of the Ministerial Declaration covering participation reads as follows: “(a) Negotiations will be open to countries applying the GATT on a de facto basis having announced, not later than April 30, 1987, their intention to accede to the GATT and to participate in the negotiations, (b) Countries that have already informed the Contracting Parties, at a regular meeting of the Council of Representatives, of their intention to negotiate the terms of their membership as a Contracting Party,” GATT, MIN. DEC., Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Uruguay Round, September 20, 1986. For background on the Soviet desire to participate in the negotiations, see Erik Dirksen, “What if the Soviet Union Applies to Join the GATT?,” The World Economy 10 (June, 1987 ): 228–30.
Philip Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft in East-West Relations: Embargoes, Sanctions, Linkage, Economic Warfare and Detente (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the RIIA, 1988): 20–21.
Penelope Hartland-Thunburg, “China’s Modernization: A Challenge to the GATT,” The Washington Quarterly 10 (Spring 1987): 82–97.
Both countries are negotiating bilaterally with China on the basis of tariff concessions. See J. E. D. McDonnell, “China’s Move to Rejoin the GATT System: an Epic Transition,” The World Economy 10 (September 1987): 331–50.
GATT, Basic Instruments, 18th Supplement 1972, p. 10.
See James Mayall, “International Society and International Theory,” in M. D. Donelan (ed.), The Reason of States (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978 ) pp. 122–41.
For an economic analysis of the case for transforming GATT into an updated ITO, see Jozef M. van Brabant, “Planned Economies in the GATT Framework: The Soviet Case,” Soviet Economy 4 (Jan-March, 1988): 3–35.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1990 David A. Baldwin and Helen V. Milner
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mayall, J. (1990). The Western Alliance, GATT and East-West Trade. In: Baldwin, D.A., Milner, H.V. (eds) East-West Trade and the Atlantic Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21049-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21049-7_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-21051-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-21049-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Business & Management CollectionBusiness and Management (R0)