Moral Disputes in Health Care

Abstract

My examination of the nature of moral disputes and their resolution will be conducted in three phases. First, an analysis of what is meant by a ‘moral dispute’. Second, an evaluation of utilitarianism and its adequacy as an ethical theory, for if the theory is itself incoherent then it is possible that an appeal to its principles, far from being useful, will not only fail to achieve a satisfactory resolution but will also tend to distort the issues at hand. Third, a more general discussion of the ways in which moral disputes may be resolved. If it can be shown that some moral conflicts are so deep-rooted that resolution is not, perhaps, ever attainable then it would appear that it is unrealistic to expect utilitarian criteria or those of any other theory to resolve them. If however the resolution of moral conflict can be attained in at least some cases, then the efficacy of utilitarian criteria can be compared with that of other possible means of resolution.