Abstract
This chapter examines the development of Britain’s foreign policy in Churchill’s ‘Atlantic’ and ‘European circles’ in the decade after 1945. The simultaneous examination of these two areas of policy is by no means accidental. As will be seen, developments in both circles were intimately related, not least because successive British governments were convinced that a revitalised ‘special relationship’ with the United States was essential if Western Europe was to be effectively defended. Britain’s main problem in this context, of course, was that the ‘Big Three’ allies had not emerged from the war united. As the previous chapter indicated, even before Potsdam British fears of the coming Soviet threat in Europe were already taking shape and, despite the closeness of Anglo-American relations in the technical and military spheres, there were certainly significant political strains in the ‘special relationship’ which gave cause for concern. As things turned out, relations with the Soviet Union were to deteriorate progressively over the next ten years and as a result Britain’s military links with Western Europe were to be substantially strengthened. Relations with the United States were actually set to worsen before they improved after July 1946.
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Notes and References
The problems of the British economy in the immediate postwar years are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
CMND 6707, Statistical Materials Presented During the Washington Negotiations (HMSO, 1945) pp. 5–8.
McNeill, Survey of International Affairs 1939–46, p. 676.
Bernard Porter, The Lion ‘s Share, pp. 260–1.
For a review of the debate, see Andrew Gamble, Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the British State (London: Macmillan, 1985);
David Coates and John Hillard (eds), The Economic Decline of Modern Britain: The Debate Between Left and Right (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986).
Monthly Digest of Statistics No. 49 (HMSO, January, 1950) p. 89. The annual deficits reported here are the published monthly averages multiplied by 12.
CMND 6743, Statement Relating to Defence (HMSO, February, 1946).
CMND 7327, Statement Relating to Defence (HMSO, February, 1948).
Ibid., p. 62.
A good example of the ‘turning-point’ thesis can be found in Christopher Mayhew, ‘British Foreign Policy Since 1945’, International Affairs, vol. 26, no. 4 (1950) pp. 477–86.
Several of the subsequent departures both from the tacit agreements made at Yalta and from the more explicit declarations made at Potsdam are catalogued in Anne Whyte, ‘Quadripartite Rule in Berlin’, International Affairs, vol. 23, no. 1 (1947) pp. 30–41.
Arnold Toynbee, ‘A Turning Point in the Cold War?’, International Affairs, vol. 26, no. 4 (1950) p. 459.
Repayments of the loan were not to begin until December 1951. They would then be paid in 50 annual installments at 2 per cent interest with no interest payable if Britain’s trade balance fell below the 1936–8 level. McNeill, Survey, p. 683.
Ibid., pp. 652–3.
Cited in ibid., p. 731.
Cited in Bartlett, The Global Conflict, p. 263.
Geoffrey Warner, ‘The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan’, International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 1 (1974) p. 83.
Mayhew, ‘British Foreign Policy’, p. 480.
‘Containment’, of course, was identified most closely with George Ken-nan, a senior policy adviser within the US State Department.
Reynolds attributes this remark to Paul Hoffman, one of the Marshall Aid administrators. See David Reynolds, ‘A special relationship’? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War’, International Affairs, vol. 62, noi. 1 (1986) p. 8.
The calculations underlying British decisions over the Brussels Treaty are discussed in John Baylis, ‘Britain, the Brussels Pact and the continental commitment’, International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 4 (1984) pp. 615–30.
Bartlett, The Global Conflict, p. 275.
A. H. Head, ‘European Defence’, International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 1 (1951) pp. 1–9.
See also M. L. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office, Anglo-American relations and the Korean War, June 1950–June 1951’, International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 3 (1986) pp. 459–78;
Peter Truscott, ‘The Korean War in British Foreign and Domestic Policy, 1950–52’ (PhD dissertation, Exeter College, Oxford, 1984) p. 24.
Bartlett, The Global Conflict, pp. 280–1.
The rearmament package was intended to cost some £4700m over the period 1951–4 (Truscott, ‘The Korean War’, pp. 108–10). This included a quadrupling of expenditure on military hardware by 1953–4 (CMND 8146, Defence Programme Statement Made By the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, January 29th 1951 (HMSO, 1951)).
The Federal German Republic achieved independence in September 1949.
The signatories were France, the Federal German Republic, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
The phrase ‘third world’ was not itself widely used until the 1960s.
The Elbe was assumed to constitute the West German border and the Rhine, the French border.
Anglo-American policy towards the oil states during the 1930s and 1940s is discussed in Sir Arthur Hearn, ‘Oil and the Middle East’, International Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (1948) pp. 63–75.
Bartlett, The Global Conflict, p. 272.
Ibid.
The express reason for the Soviets’ action was the Americans’ refusal to allow the People’s Republic of China a seat at the UN.
Kenneth Younger, ‘Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, vol. 40, no. 1 (1964) p. 26.
CAB 128/18 CM (50) 79, (11 Nov. 1950) cited in Truscott, ‘The Korean War’, p. 18.
Bartlett, The Global Conflict, p. 298.
Note from Dean Acheson to Ernest Bevin ( 10 July 1950) cited in Truscott, ‘The Korean War’, p. 3.
Ibid., p. 4.
Bartlett, The Global Conflict, p. 299.
This was certainly what Truman — according to his memoirs — told Attlee at their meeting in Washington in December 1950. See Truscott, ‘The Korean War’, p. 38.
Kenneth Younger, then Minister of State at the Foreign Office, observed: ‘We were simply resigned to the fact that MacArthur had gone mad and was totally out of control’. See ibid., pp. 58–59.
Ibid., p. 68.
Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid., pp. 14–16.
N. Henderson, ‘Britain’s Decline: its Causes and Consequences’, The Economist (2 July 1979) p. 34.
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© 1989 David Sanders
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Sanders, D. (1989). From Potsdam to Cold War: Relations with Europe and the Superpowers, 1945–55. In: Losing an Empire, Finding a Role. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20747-3_3
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