Abstract
Events on the Polish front between the Baranovichi meeting of 2 August and Pilsudski’s counterattack of 16–17 August present a most confused and complicated picture. One prominent historian who analysed these events in terms of Glavkom directives had to confess:
‘I am abandoning the goal of rapidly destroying the Polish forces [and] am without enthusiasm for the deep strategy, since ... I fear we will not have the time necessary for a decision of this nature.’
— S. S. Kamenev1
(August 10)
Kamenev: ‘Assistance is needed from you.’ Tukhachevsky: ‘Of course, I will do nothing against circumstances. I can withdraw 1500 to 2000 men and then gradually I will be pushed out...’
Kamenev: ‘I understand, this is in full agreement with my decision.’ 2
(August 15)
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© 1990 Thomas C. Fiddick
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Fiddick, T.C. (1990). Sergei S. Kamenev, Glavkom and the Struggle Over Red Army Strategy. In: Russia’s Retreat from Poland, 1920. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20654-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20654-4_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-20656-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20654-4
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