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US Thinking About Arms Competition and Arms Control

  • Gloria Duffy

Abstract

Since 1945, the dominant American approach to strategic arms control has been neo-Clausewitzian. That is, to paraphrase the early nineteenth-century German military strategist, arms control has been regarded as an extension of politics by other, negotiated means. Arms control has been seen as useful to the US chiefly as an avenue for restraining the Soviet Union, without hampering the US ability to effectively pursue the military competition, rather than as a means for constraining the arms race.

Keywords

Nuclear Weapon Bargaining Chip Soviet Force Strategic Force Strategic Thinker 
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Notes

  1. 1.
    Colin Gray, ‘Arms Control: Problems’, in R. James Woolsey (ed.) Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics, San Francisco, CA, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984, p. 169.Google Scholar
  2. 4.
    Jonathan Schell, The Abolition, New York, Knopf, 1984, p. 160Google Scholar
  3. 6.
    Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster, New York, Pantheon, 1986, p. 141.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Carl G. Jacobsen 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gloria Duffy

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