Abstract
Since 1945, the dominant American approach to strategic arms control has been neo-Clausewitzian. That is, to paraphrase the early nineteenth-century German military strategist, arms control has been regarded as an extension of politics by other, negotiated means. Arms control has been seen as useful to the US chiefly as an avenue for restraining the Soviet Union, without hampering the US ability to effectively pursue the military competition, rather than as a means for constraining the arms race.
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Notes
Colin Gray, ‘Arms Control: Problems’, in R. James Woolsey (ed.) Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics, San Francisco, CA, Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984, p. 169.
Jonathan Schell, The Abolition, New York, Knopf, 1984, p. 160
Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster, New York, Pantheon, 1986, p. 141.
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© 1990 Carl G. Jacobsen
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Duffy, G. (1990). US Thinking About Arms Competition and Arms Control. In: Jacobsen, C.G. (eds) Strategic Power: USA/USSR. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20574-5_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20574-5_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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