Abstract
In a dynamic context a decision maker at any instant t has information about his exogenous economic environment both at time t and at later dates. We represent the environment at t by a vector x(t) of exogenous variables, and their future values by (x(t + l),c + 2),…,ü + T)). The horizon T is determined by such considerations as length of life, technology, resource limitations etc.; it might be infinite. A decision rule at time t is a map ψt associating with a vector of a variables z, the variable d representing the choice of the decision maker. We write d = ψt(z). Myopic decision rules refer to those maps of the form d(t) = ψt(x(t)) in which d(t) depends only upon the values of the exogenous variables at time t, disregarding any information about future conditions of the economic environment. A decision rule is said to be non–myopic if it is of the form d(t) = ψt(x(t), x(t=l),…,x(t+T)).
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© 1990 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Kurz, M. (1990). Myopic Decision Rules. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Utility and Probability. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20568-4_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20568-4_19
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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