The Way Ahead: The European Confrontation in a Global Framework

Abstract

Given the complexity of negotiating force reductions, would unilateral action in each alliance on the lines of that decided on by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in the fall of 1988 be better? Can the United States and NATO do anything to make the challenges of negotiation, which include decisions about the future of nuclear deterrence in NATO, less formidable and less divisive? What would success in negotiating reductions mean for the long-term future of both alliances? Would build-down of the NATO/Pact military confrontation intensify instability in eastern Europe, the problem we identified in Chapter 3 as the most likely source of war in Europe if war comes? What effect would build-down have on the division of Europe and, more particularly, on the division of Germany? In this last chapter we will try to rough out some answers to these questions.