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Paths to War pp 128-166 | Cite as

The Cut Price War on the Peripheries: The French General Staff, The Rhineland And Czechoslovakia

  • Nicole Jordan
Chapter

Abstract

In late January 1933, during the week in which Adolf Hitler took power in Germany, Maurice Gamelin, the heir apparent of the French defence establishment, met General Jan Syrovÿ, chief of the Czechoslovak general staff, for unofficial talks in Paris. Since 1930, five years ahead of schedule, French troops had been withdrawn from the demilitarised Rhineland zone. An international disarmament conference had been in session in Geneva since 1932. German demands for equality of rights at the disarmament conference, to which the French had recently made important concessions, signified to Gamelin and his Czech colleague in January 1933 that the Germans intended to remilitarise and fortify the Rhineland. The two agreed that Germany would then attack in the east. Walled in by German fortifications, France would be unable to force the barrier erected against it in order to aid an unspecified ally in the east.2

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Notes and References

  1. 1.
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© Nicole Jordon 1989

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  • Nicole Jordan

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