Abstract
Economic modernisation has created a vital link between military capability and economic strength. Modern technology and modern industry have transformed the nature of warfare and armaments. The larger the economy, and the more sophisticated its scientific and technical base, the greater its military strength. This has been a natural development, made explicit by the slow emergence of an international system dominated by the ‘super powers’. Yet in Europe the nature of this relationship was only fully recognized during the First World War, with the coming of industrialised warfare and the strategies of blockade and attrition. The armies that marched to war in 1914 expected quick victories, with the weapons to hand. By 1918 the concept of total war, the mobilisation of all material and moral resources for the war effort, had replaced the traditional strategy, born in an age of agrarian states, of a quick, mobile campaign.
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Notes and References
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on synthetic fuel see W. Birkenfeld, Der synthetische Treibstoff 1933–1945 (Göttingen, 1963) p. 77 ff.
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There is interesting, if unreliable, testimony in H. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks (London, 1939).
See too the recent discussion in E. Robertson, ‘Hitler’s Planning for War and the Response of the Great Powers 1938 to early 1939’ in H. Koch (ed.) Aspects of the Third Reich (London, 1985) pp. 206–34.
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For details see G. Plumpe, ‘Industrie, technischer Fortschritt und Staat. Die Kautschuksynthese in Deutschland 1906–1944/5’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (1983) p. 594; on the Reichswerke IWM FD 264/46 ‘Konzernverzeichnis HGW Montanblock’; on the Schnellplan
A. Bagel-Bohlan, Hitlers industrielle Kriegsvorbereitung 1936 bis 1939 (Koblenz, 1975) pp. 117–21.
Overy, Goering, p. 84. The place of propaganda in German war preparations is an important one. Both the army and Hitler put great value on morale — attitudes to authority, the willingness to accept sacrifices, psychological orientation to military goals. See J. Sywottek, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg: die propagandistische Vorbereitung der deutschen Bevölkerung auf dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Opladen, 1976) pp. 94–103, 194–201; D. Aigner, Das Ringen um England: die öffentliche Meinung 1933–1939 (Munich, 1969) pp. 349–53.
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NA T177 Roll 14, frames 3698585–8, letter from Luftwaffe General Staff to Generalluftzeugmeister, 9.8.1939; R.J. Overy, ‘From “Uralbomber” to “Amerikabomber”: the Luftwaffe and Strategic Bombing’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1(1978), pp. 155–7.
D. Irving, The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe (London, 1973) p. 150.
R.J. Overy, ‘Hitler’s War and the German Economy: a Reinterpretation’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 35 (1982), pp. 276–7.
J. Gillingham, ‘The “Deproletarianization” of German Society: Vocational Training in the Third Reich’ Journal of Social History 19 (1985/6), pp. 427–8; see too IWM Mi 14/478, Heereswaffenamt, Die personelle Leistungsfähigkeit Deutschlands im Mob. Fall’, March 1939.
A. Schröter, J. Bach, ‘Zur Planung der wehrwirtschaftlichen Mobilma-chung durch den deutschen faschistischen Imperialismus vor dem Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges’ Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 17 (1978), pp. 42–5
W. Treue, ‘Die Einstellung einiger deutschen Grossindustriellen zu Hitlers Aussenpolitik’ Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 17 (1966), pp. 103–4. On the attitude of industry to mobilisation planning see IWM EDS Mi 14/294 (file 5), Wi Rü Amt Die mangelnde Vorberei-tung der Industrie durch den GBW’, 24.11.1939. On industry and the business cycle see Geyer ‘Rüstungsbeschleunigung’ pp. 134–6.
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See too C. Bloch, ‘Die Wechselwirkung der Nationalsozialistischen Innen-und Aussenpolitik 1933–1939’ in M. Funke (ed.) Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte (Düsseldorf, 1976) pp. 205–21.
Something along these lines has already been argued by Mason himself. See T.W. Mason, ‘Die Bändigung der Arbeiterklasse im Deutschland’ in C. Sachse et al. (eds.), Angst, Belohnung, Zucht und Ordnung: Herr-schaftsmechanismus im Nationalsozialismus (Düsseldorf, 1982) pp. 48–53.
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B. Dahlerus, Last Attempt (London, 1948). p. 119.
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© 1989 Richard Overy
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Overy, R. (1989). Hitler’s War Plans And The German Economy. In: Boyce, R., Robertson, E.M. (eds) Paths to War. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20333-8_4
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