Religious Plurality

  • J. Kellenberger
Part of the Library of Philosophy and Religion book series

Abstract

In this fourth and final chapter I shall be concerned to relate what we have seen about God-relationships, or relationships to Divine Reality, to the issue of religious plurality. This is the issue that arises from the fact that there is a diversity of religions in the world. Put simply, as a religious individual might put it to himself or herself, it is this: How does my religion relate to other religions? Put differently, from a perspective surveying the range of religions — Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the rest — the issue is this: How are the religions of the world related to one another? The issue of religious plurality may be addressed by a number of views. In fact, if we take the second, broader formulation of the issue, we can see that there is room for the essentially anti-religious response that all religions are false, each being evidence against the other. Here, however, we are concerned with the views that religions persons might take when they contemplate the range of religious traditions opposed to their own and ask how their own relates to these others. Several views are possible.

Keywords

Coherence Posit Ethical Ideal Defend Decid 

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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© J. Kellenberger 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Kellenberger
    • 1
  1. 1.California State UniversityNorthridgeUSA

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