Advertisement

Auctions

  • Vernon L. Smith
Part of the The New Palgrave book series (NPA)

Abstract

Herodotus reports the use of auctions as early as 500 BC in Babylon (see Cassady, 1967, pp. 26–40 for references to this and the following historical notes). The Romans made extensive use of auctions in commerce and the Roman emperors Caligula and Aurelius auctioned royal furniture and heirlooms to pay debts. Roman military expeditions were accompanied by traders who bid for the spoils of war auctioned sub hasta (under the spear) by soldiers. In AD 193 the Praetorian Guard seized the crown from the emperor Pertinax and auctioned it to the highest bidder, Didius, who, upon paying each guardsman the winning bid, 6250 drachmas, was declared emperor of Rome. It would appear that the Romans used the ‘English’ progressive method of auctioning, since the word auction is derived from the Latin root auctus (an increase).

Keywords

Combinatorial Auction Price Auction Multiple Unit Bidding Behaviour Winning Bidder 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  1. Amihud, Y. (ed.) 1976. Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Arthur, H. 1976. The structure and use of auctions. In Amihud (1976).Google Scholar
  3. Cassady, R. 1967. Auctions and Auctioneering. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  4. Cox, J., Roberson, B. and Smith, V. 1982. Theory and behavior of single unit auctions. In Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.Google Scholar
  5. Cox, J., Smith, V. and Walker, J. 1984. Theory and behavior of multiple unit discriminative auctions. Journal of Finance 39(4), September, 983–1010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. 1981. Allocation mechanisms and the design of auctions. Econometrica 49(6), November, 1477–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Holt, C. 1980. Competitive bidding for contracts under alternative auction procedures. Journal of Political Economy 88(3), June, 433–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Jarecki, H. 1976. Bullion dealing, commodity exchange trading and the London gold fixing. In Amihud(1976).Google Scholar
  9. Kagel, J., Levin, J., Battalio, R. and Meyer, D. 1983. Common value auctions: some initial experimental results. University of Houston Working Paper, November.Google Scholar
  10. Milgrom, P. and Weber, R. 1982. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50(5), September, 1089–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Rassenti, S., Smith, V. and Bulfin, R. 1982. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics 13(2), Autumn, 402–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Vickrey, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16(1), March, 8–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Vickrey, W. 1962. Auctions and bidding games. In Recent Advances in Game Theory, Proceedings of a Conference, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Vickrey, W. 1976. Auctions, markets and optimal allocation. In Amihud (1976).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vernon L. Smith

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations