Abstract
The economic theory of teams addresses a middle ground between the theory of individual decision under uncertainty and the theory of games. A team is made up of a number of decision-makers, with common interests and beliefs, but controlling different decision variables and basing their decisions on (possibly) different information. The theory of teams is concerned with (1) the allocation of decision variables (tasks) and information among the members of the team, and (2) the characterization of efficient decision rules, given the allocation of tasks and information.
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© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Radner, R. (1989). Teams. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Allocation, Information and Markets. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_30
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