Allen, F. 1981. The prevention of default. Journal of Finance 36, May 271–6.
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1982. The welfare economics of moral hazard. Discussion Paper No. 465, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, March.
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1985. Labor turnover, wage structures, and moral hazard: the inefficiency of competitive markets. Journal of Labor Economics 3(4), 434–62.
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1986. Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation. Journal of Public Economics 29(1), February, 1–24.
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1987. Randomization with asymmetric information: a simplified exposition. Bell Journal of Economics 17.
Arrow, K.J. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Helsinki: Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation.
Azariadis, C. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1983. Implicit contracts and fixed price equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), Supplement, 1–22.
Braverman, A. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1982. Sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets. American Economic Review 72(4), September, 695–715.
Eaton, J. and Gersovitz, M. 1981. Debt with potential repudiation; theoretical and empirical analysis. Review of Economic Studies 48, 289–309.
Fellingham, J.C., Kwon, Y.K. and Newman, D.P. 1982. Ex ante randomization in agency models. Rand Journal of Economic Studies 15, 290–301.
Gjesdal, F. 1982. Information and incentives: the agency information problem. Review of Economic Studies 49, 373–90.
Green, J. and Stokey, N. 1983. A comparison of tournaments and contests. Journal of Political Economy 91, 349–64.
Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1986. Externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(4), May, 229–64.
Grossman, S. and Hart, Q. 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51(1), January, 7–45.
Hart, O. 1983. Optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information: an introduction. Review of Economic Studies 50, 3–35.
Helpman, E. and Laffont, J.J. 1975. On moral hazard in general equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 10, 8–23.
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), Spring, 74–91.
Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13, Autumn, 324–40.
Keeton, W.R. 1979. Equilibrium Credit Rationing. New York: Garland Publishing.
Lazear, E. and Rosen, S. 1981. Rank order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89, 841–64.
Mirrlees, J. 1971. An exploration of the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38(2), April, 175–208.
Mirrlees, J. 1974. Notes on welfare economics, information, and uncertainty. In Contributions to Economic Analysis, ed. M.S. Balch, D.L. McFadden and S.Y. Wu, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mirrlees, J. 1976. The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization. Bell Journal of Economics 7(1), Spring, 105–31.
Nalebuff, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1983a. Information, competition and markets. American Economic Review 72(2), May, 278–84.
Nalebuff, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1983b. Prizes and incentives: towards a general theory of compensation and competition. Bell Journal of Economics 14, Spring, 21–43.
Pauly, M.V. 1968. The economics of moral hazard: comment. American Economic Review 58, June, 531–6.
Radner, R. 1981. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship. Econometrica 49, September, 1127–48.
Radner, R. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1983. A nonconcavity in the value of innovation. In Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, ed. M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Ross, S. 1973. The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. American Economic Review 63(2), May, 134–9.
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4), November, 629–49.
Salop, S. 1977. The noisy monopolist: imperfect information, price dispersion and price discrimination. Review of Economic Studies 44, October, 393–406.
Salop, S. and Salop, J. 1976. Self-selection and turnover in the labor market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, November, 619–28.
Sappington, D. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1987. Information and regulation. In Public Regulation: New Perspectives on Institutions and Policies, ed. E. Bailey, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Spence, A.M. and Zeckhauser, R. 1971. Insurance, information, and individual action. American Economic Review 61(2), May, 380–87.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1974. Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies 41, April, 219–55.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1975. Incentives, risk, and information: notes toward a theory of hierarchy. Bell Journal of Economics 6(2), Autumn, 552–79.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1977. Monopoly non-linear pricing and imperfect information: the insurance market. Review of Economic Studies 44, October, 407–30.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1982a. Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation. Journal of Public Economics 17, 213–40.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1982b. Utilitarianism and horizontal equity: the case for random taxation. Journal of Public Economics 18, 1–33.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1987. On the causes and consequences of the dependence of quality on price. Journal of Economic Literature 27, March, 1–48.
Stiglitz, J.E. 1986. Theories of wage rigidity. In Keynes’ Economic Legacy, ed. J. Butkiewicz, K. Koford and J. Miller, New York: Praeger Publishers, 153–221.
Stiglitz, J.E. and Weiss, A. 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review 71(3), June, 393–410.
Stiglitz, J.E. and Weiss, A. 1983. Incentive effects of terminations: applications to the credit and labor markets. American Economic Review 73, December, 912–27.
Weiss, L. 1976. On the desirability of cheating, incentives and randomness in the optimal income tax. Journal of Political Economy 84, 1343–52.