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Game Theory pp 185-193 | Cite as

Oligopoly and Game Theory

  • Hugo Sonnenschein
Part of the The New Palgrave book series

Abstract

Oligopoly theory is concerned with market structures in which the actions of individual firms affect and are affected by the actions of other firms. Unlike the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly, strategic issues are fundamental to the study of such markets. In this entry we will explain some of the central themes of oligopoly theory, both modern and classical, and emphasize the connection between these themes and developments in the noncooperative theory of games.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Efficient Scale Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Aggregate Output Free Entry 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hugo Sonnenschein

There are no affiliations available

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