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- Game Theory
- Cooperative Game
- Pure Strategy
- Solution Concept
- Coalitional Form
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Aumann, R.J. (1989). Game Theory. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_1
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