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A Counter-Insurgency Defeat: Some Reasons Why

  • Chapter
Book cover The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47

Part of the book series: Studies in Military and Strategic History ((SMSH))

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Abstract

Clausewitz called the decisive phase of conflict the ‘culminating point’.1 This point may be easily discernible in a conventional conflict: a significant defeat on the battlefield which shifts the strategic balance conclusively against one belligerent. However, in insurgency the turning point is often less than clear, for the results on the battlefield are significant only to the extent that they affect political and strategic decisions on further conduct of the campaign. The culminating point is reached when the leaders on one side have been convinced that they can no longer impose constraints on the decisions and actions of the other. The result is a stalemate, which often favours the insurgents who win by demonstrating that the security forces cannot contain the insurgency.

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Notes

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Conflict Studies, The University of New Brunswick, Canada

    David A. Charters (Director)

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  1. David A. Charters
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© 1989 David A. Charers

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Charters, D.A. (1989). A Counter-Insurgency Defeat: Some Reasons Why. In: The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19975-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19975-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-19977-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-19975-4

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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