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From No Cities to Stable Vulnerability

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US Nuclear Strategy

Abstract

The Kennedy administration took office in January 1961 expecting to inherit a nuclear imbalance in the favour of the Soviet Union; in fact, as photographs from new reconnaissance satellites soon revealed, the actual situation was just the reverse. American intelligence had anticipated hundreds of Soviet missiles aimed at the United States by 1961. In fact, there were just a handful. In the interim, the Eisenhower administration had accelerated production of both Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris SLBMs and the new Administration made further increases early in its tenure.

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Additional Reading

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  • Abraham Chayes and Jerome Wiesner (eds.), ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System ( New York: Harper & Row, 1969 ).

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  • Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age ( New York: Wiley, 1963 )

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  • Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966 ).

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  • William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964)

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  • Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds) Limited Strategic War ( New York; Praeger, 1962 ).

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  • B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defence ( London: Stevens, 1960 ).

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  • Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office ( London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968 ).

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  • Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance ( Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962 ).

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  • Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966 ).

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  • Walter Slocombe, The Political Implications of Strategic Parity ( London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971 ).

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© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Treverton, G.F. (1989). From No Cities to Stable Vulnerability. In: Bobbitt, P., Freedman, L., Treverton, G.F. (eds) US Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19791-0_14

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