Abstract
The argument presented so far suggests that nuclear deterrence probably has helped to keep the peace in Europe over the past forty-five years and, without being unduly complacent, there are no overwhelmingly strong reasons to suppose that it will not continue to work for some time to come. This is not to argue that we should not be searching for something better and safer. If a convincing case for the retention of some form of nuclear deterrence is to be made (at least until something demonstrably better is found) it is, however, necessary to go further and confront directly the criticisms which have been levelled against the British nuclear deterrent and NATO strategy by the ‘peace movement’ and supporters of a non-nuclear strategy. These criticisms often take the following form:
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Notes
T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960 ), pp. 187–204.
H. Wilson, In Place of Dollars (London: Tribune Pamphlet, 1952).
Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939–1970 ( London: Oxford University Press, 1972 ), p. 316.
Robert Neild, How to make up your mind about the Bomb ( London: Andre Deutsch, 1981 ), p. 8.
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© 1989 Ken Booth and John Baylis
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Booth, K., Baylis, J. (1989). How Valid are the Criticisms of Nuclear Deterrence?. In: Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19667-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19667-8_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-43404-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-19667-8
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