Abstract
Thus far I have isolated and examined the ordinary uses of the word ‘know’. I have indicated the necessary and sufficient conditions for these various uses. However, I do not now claim to have exhausted the meaning of the word ‘know’. I take to heart Wittgenstein’s warning, ‘One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word “know”.’1
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Notes
L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1974) p.534.
These are ‘A Defence of Common Sense’ and ‘Proof of an External World’. Both papers appear in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959).
The references are to the number paragraphs of On Certainty. A. Kenny imagines the whole as a discussion between Moore, Wittgenstein and Descartes. Cf. A. Kenny, Wittgenstein (London: Allen Lane, 1973) pp.203ff.
This is to understand the nature of language—games as being constituted by a certain tacit presupposition; in the case of religious belief, the tacit presupposition is the concept of God. Cf. W. D. Hudson, A Philosophical Approach to Religion (London: Macmillan 1974) pp.8ff. I shall discuss the question of fundamental propositions and the possibility of doubt in the final chapter.
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© 1988 Brian Haymes
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Haymes, B. (1988). On Certainty. In: The Concept of the Knowledge of God. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19066-9_9
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