Abstract
I propose in this chapter to give an account of what is usually termed ‘inferential knowledge’. We all make knowledge claims. We draw inferences on the basis of evidence. It is this use of ‘know’ and its cognates that I am now going to examine.
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Notes
A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (London: Penguin Books 1972) p.35.
For example, E. L. Gettier, ‘Is justified True Belief Knowledge?’ in Knowledge and Belief, edited by A.P. Griffiths (London: Oxford University Press 1968) pp.144–6.
J. Hick, Faith and Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1967) p.208.
For a full discussion of Gettier’s note and the discussion it has provoked see R. K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton University Press, 1983).
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© 1988 Brian Haymes
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Haymes, B. (1988). Inferential Knowledge. In: The Concept of the Knowledge of God. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19066-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19066-9_3
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