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The Social Dimension of Nuclear Strategy

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Abstract

In the preceding chapter I introduced a theorem, viz, that any present effort to cure decoupling through the deployment of weapons must either fail (in that, despite deployment, the threshold of US nuclear commitment is not reduced) or ‘succeed’ and thereby uncouple the central and extended theatres. The Countervailing Strategy, I argued, would provoke political division between the United States and her allies, threatening the long-term viability of the strategy, and casting doubt on the vitality of the strategy itself. One requirement of a deterrent strategy must be to render that strategy convincingly executable in crises or when deterrence fails.

‘O frati,’ dissi ‘che per cento milia perigli siete giunti a l’occidente…. Considerate la vostra semenza: fatti non foste a viver come bruit, ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.’

(‘O brothers,’ I said, ‘who through a thousand perils have reached the West…. Take thought of the seed from which you spring. You were not born to live as brutes, but to follow virtue and knowledge.’)

Canto XXVI, Inferno

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Notes and References

  1. See Richard M. Nixon. A Report to the Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s, A New Strategy for Peace 18 February 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970) Doc. Pr. 37.2: F 76), p. 122, repeated the following year, 25 February 1971

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  2. Richard M. Nixon, A Report to the Congress, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace (Washington: GPO, 1971) Doc. Pr. 37.2: F 76/971), pp. 170–1. Lynn Davis states that at ‘the time this report was issued, officials in the Defense Department were puzzled and irritated because the drafters of the Presidential message knew… that existing war plans did not confront the President with such choices,’ i.e., either ‘ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians’ or nothing. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options p. 3.

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  3. James Kelly, ‘Thinking About the Unthinkable,’ Time 119 (29 March 1982), p. 10.

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  4. Theodore Draper, ‘How Not to Think About Nuclear War’, The New York Review of Books 29 (15 July 1982), p. 36.

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  5. Peter Paret, ‘Clausewitz and the Nineteenth Century’, Theory and Practice of War (London: Cassell, 1965) pp. 21–41, argues that Clausewitz recognized that war had become a matter for the people as a whole.

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  6. See also Bernard Brodie, ‘On Clausewitz: A Passion for War’, World Politics 25 (January 1973), pp. 288–308.

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  7. Strategic Survey 1980–1981 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) p. 15; see also Leslie Gelb, ‘Reagan Arms Plan’, New York Times, 15 May 1981.

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  8. Ronald Reagan, ‘US Program for Peace and Arms Control,’ US Department of State Current Policy no. 346, 18 November 1981, p. 3.

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  9. Francois de Rose, Letter to the Editor, Survival 24 (May/June 1982), p. 143.

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  10. See Jeremy Stone, ‘Presidential First Use is Unlawful’, Foreign Policy 56 (Fall 1984), pp. 94–112.

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© 1988 Philip Bobbitt

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Bobbitt, P. (1988). The Social Dimension of Nuclear Strategy. In: Democracy and Deterrence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18991-5_9

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