Scepticism and Natural Belief

Abstract

Hume’s total rejection of the a priori arguments for god’s existence, his damaging critique of the design arguments, his use of the problem of evil to question the probability of god having moral attributes, the doubts which he sheds on the meaning and comprehensibility of the language of ‘divinity and school metaphysics’ all these lead to the question: If there are no good and sufficient grounds for a reasoned belief in god, why is the belief so widely held? A number of distinct answers to this question are discussed by Hume.

’Tis happy, therefore, that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding …

Tho’ the common opinion concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body be false, ’tis the most natural of any, and has alone any primary recommendation to the fancy …

Treatise, 187 & 213