Meaning, School Metaphysics and Divinity

Abstract

One of Hume’s conclusions in the Enquiry is that divinity and school metaphysics are ‘sophistry and illusion’ unless they are found to contain matters of fact or abstract demonstrations. Elsewhere he observes that arguments about god’s nature or the origin of worlds carry us ‘quite beyond the reach of our faculties’, that we have ‘no idea’ of certain theological positions and that if we predicate such a term as ‘good’ of the deity it can only have the normal or anthropomorphic sense ‘for we know no other’. These and many other apparent strictures on the comprehensibility of theology invite the questions whether, to what extent, and on what grounds Hume regarded religious belief as incomprehensible and the language in which it is expressed as meaningless. In this chapter I shall consider these questions under three heads. First, the use Hume makes of his impression/idea dichotomy as a criterion of meaning. Secondly, his requirement that if ordinary language predicates are to be used meaningfully in theology then they must be kept reasonably close to their normal meanings. Finally, but more important of all, Hume’s general thesis, which he shares with Locke, that certain subjects lie beyond the limits of human understanding and therefore we cannot have any rational confidence about the truth concerning them.

I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension … and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.

Locke, Essay