In Chapter 3 it was stated that though there was no clear-cut distinction between common-sense and scientific facts, there were two criteria to guide assessment of the status of facts, namely level of theory and precision of expression; it was also stated that precision of expression could involve the use of technical terms. These criteria also apply to the distinction between common-sense and scientific explanations, though, as with the distinction between the two types of facts, it cannot be clear-cut. In so far as the first criterion, level of theory, is concerned, there has been discussion in Chapter 3, but the use of technical terms to help precision of expression deserves further consideration.
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- 1.The view that a genuine empirical explanation or theory must be subject to refutation by observation has been developed by Sir Karl Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1972) and in other writings of his. See also Chapter 9, note 1.Google Scholar
- 3.See J. Trusted, The Logic of Scientific Inference (London: Macmillan, 1979), Chapter 6, Section iv.Google Scholar
- 7.G. Ryle, Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 90–1.Google Scholar