Abstract
As the regime failed to put into effect the reforms it had promised at the time of the coup, disenchantment spread, and the regime’s political support in the country dwindled. Amin’s response to this was to short-circuit the normal political machinery of government, resorting first to rule by decree, and then to outright repression through violence. Lacking support from the civilian population, Amin concentrated on keeping the Army under his control, through skilful public relations with regard to the rank and file, narrowing the Army base into a Sudanic-speaking and Muslim force, and continual intimidation and strategic transference of top military officers. He also manipulated the theme of foreign threat to the country to distract people from their domestic problems, and constantly resorted to violence as a means of extracting compliance from the population.
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© 1987 Amii Omara-Otunnu
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Omara-Otunnu, A. (1987). Amin’s Manipulation of the Military (1973–77). In: Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890–1985. St Antony’s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18736-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18736-2_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-18738-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-18736-2
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