The Function of Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations in the International Resource Transfer — The Case of the World Bank

  • Bruno S. Frey
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)


The problem of international resource transfer, in particular from the industrialized countries to the less developed countries, can be analyzed from two quite distinct points of view: the social welfare maximizing and the political economy approaches.


Moral Hazard Donor Country World Banker Selfish Behavior Borda Count 
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© International Economic Association 1986

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  • Bruno S. Frey

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