Abstract
The problem of international resource transfer, in particular from the industrialized countries to the less developed countries, can be analyzed from two quite distinct points of view: the social welfare maximizing and the political economy approaches.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Arrow, Kenneth J., Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd Ed., New York 1963.
Baldwin, Robert E., The Political Economy of Postwar U.S. Trade Policy. New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, The Bulletin No. 4, 1976.
—, “The Political Economy of Protectionism”. In: Jagdish N. Bhagwati (Ed.), Import Competition and Response. Cambridge 1982, pp. 263–292.
Brams, Steven J., Game Theory and Politics. New York 1975.
Brock, William A., Stephen P. Magee, “The Economics of Special Interest Politics?: The Case of the Tariff”. The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 68, 1978, pp. 246–250.
Buchanan, James M., The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago 1975.
—, Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station 1977.
—, Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor 1962.
Caves, Richard E., “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada’s Tariff Structure”. The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, 1976, pp. 278–300.
Dreyer, Jacob S., Andrew Schotter, “Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund: The Consequences of Quota Changes”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62, 1980, pp. 97–106.
Findlay, Ronald, Stanislaw Wellisz, “Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions”. Kyklos, Vol. 36, 1983, pp. 469–481.
Frey, Bruno S., Democratic Economic Policy. Oxford 1983.
—, International Political Economics. Oxford 1984.
—, Friedrich Schneider, Competing Models of International Lending Activity. University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Economic Research, 1983, mimeo.
Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley 1945. (Reprinted 1969.)
Kindleberger, Charles P., Power and Money — The Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics. New York 1970.
MacBean, Alasdair I., P. Nicholas Snowden, International Institutions in Trade and Finance. London 1981.
Mason, Edward S., Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. The Brookings Institution, Washington 1973.
Mueller, Dennis C., Public Choice. Cambridge 1979.
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
Schotter, Andrew, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge 1981.
Sen, Amartya K., Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Edinburgh 1970.
Theil, Henri, Optimal Decision Rules for Government and Industry. Amsterdam 1964.
Tinbergen, Jan, Economic Policy: Principles and Design. Amsterdam 1956.
Vaubel, Roland, Konsenspflicht aus ökonomischer Sicht. Contribution to the Symposium “Mehrheitsprinzip, Konsens und Verfassung”. Kiel 1984, mimeo.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1986 International Economic Association
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Frey, B.S. (1986). The Function of Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations in the International Resource Transfer — The Case of the World Bank. In: Balassa, B., Giersch, H. (eds) Economic Incentives. International Economic Association Series . Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18204-6_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18204-6_17
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-18206-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-18204-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)