Disequilibrium Analysis in Developing Economies: An Overview

  • Bela Balassa


Following contributions by Haberler,1 Bhagwati and Ramaswami2 and Johnson,3 Bhagwati4 formulated a general theory of distortions in product and in factor markets. Bhagwati distinguished between ‘endogenous’ and ‘policy-imposed’ distortions, depending on whether departures from optimal resource allocation result from market imperfections or from policy actions.


Interest Rate Real Interest Rate Factor Market Welfare Cost Minimum Wage Legislation 
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Copyright information

© The World Bank and Bela Balassa 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bela Balassa
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.The Johns Hopkins UniversityUSA
  2. 2.The World BankUSA

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