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Legislation, the Courts and the Demand for Compensation

  • Anthony Ogus
Part of the British Association for the Advancement of Science book series (BAAS)

Abstract

The appropriateness of including the subject of law and economics and indeed the participation of myself, an academic lawyer, in a book devoted to the theme of ‘Economy and Democracy’ requires, perhaps, some initial explanation. Law and economics has been a flourishing area of interdisciplinary study in North America for the last two decades or so. It has taken some time to reach these shores and only now is it beginning to establish itself on a secure basis.1 The benefits to be derived by the two disciplines involved are mutual: lawyers, if they are to understand and evaluate the workings of the legal system, must recognise the economic functioning of legal rules and institutions; economists, for their part, in analysing the behavioural aspects of resource management, must appreciate the critical importance of those. rules and institutions. I trust that this chapter will serve as a useful illustration of both propositions.

Keywords

Corrective Justice Legislative Process Liability Rule Judicial Process Minimise Transaction Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes And References

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Copyright information

© The British Association for the Advancement of Science 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anthony Ogus

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