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The North Atlantic Alliance and Southern Africa, 1949–74

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NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa

Part of the book series: Rusi Defence Studies Series ((RUSIDS))

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Abstract

From the time the nationalist revolt broke out in Angola (1961), Portugal’s refusal to transfer power in its African colonies and NATO’s apparent reluctance to stand firm on the issue combined to give credence to Soviet claims that the Portuguese were members of an ‘aggressively imperialist’ alliance.1 Britain’s ‘collusion’ with South Africa helped contribute to the picture. Events in Southern Africa lost NATO the friendship of many African states and won it the respect of none.

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Notes and References

  1. For Soviet statements typical of the 1960s see Patricia Wohlgemuth ‘The Portuguese Territories and the UN’, International Conciliation, 545, November 1963, pp. 21–37.

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Coker, C. (1985). The North Atlantic Alliance and Southern Africa, 1949–74. In: NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa. Rusi Defence Studies Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17884-1_3

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