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The United States, Britain and the Military Atom: Retrospect and Evaluation

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The Independent Nuclear State

Abstract

The preceding account of the evolution of American and British policies towards the development of nuclear technology for military purposes in the United Kingdom offers grounds for arguing that it can best be understood in the context of a chronological movement from one type of relationship to another. Concepts of dependency, interdependency and self-sufficiency play a central role in describing this progression, but the civil/military divide, the nature of state decision-making systems and weapon development processes are less visibly linked to these chronological stages, and, in some cases, impinge upon what was occurring in a random fashion. As a consequence the types of dependency, interdependency and self-sufficiency found within the Anglo-American nuclear relationship will be examined first (together with a breakdown of the period into chronological stages), followed by the interrelationship between these stages and the other ideas.

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Notes and References

  1. For the substance of this debate see K. Kaiser, ‘The great nuclear debate: German/American disagreement’, Foreign Policy, vol. 30 (Spring 1978) p. 93;

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  2. M. Brenner, ‘Carter’s non-proliferation policy’, ORBIS, vol. 22, no. 2 (Summer 1978);

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  3. F. Williams, ‘The United States Congress and non-proliferation’, International Security, vo.3, no. 2 (Fall 1978) pp. 45–60;

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  4. and A. G. McGrew, ‘Nuclear revisionism: the United States and the nuclear non-proliferation act of 1978’, Millenium, vol. 73, no. 3 (Winter 1978–9) pp. 237–50.

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  5. Cf. Lord Chalfont, the Minister for Disarmament in the Wilson government, speaking to the ENDC during the negotiations leading up to the NPT. ‘“Do as I say, not as I do”’ is a logically indefensible precept, but in an imperfect world it may be a necessary one for a particular short period of history’ quoted in SIPRI, Postures for Non-proliferation, p. 129.

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  6. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 August 1982, pp. 72–5. This states that the use of large computers at the Los Alamos weapon laboratory during the late 1970s reduced the number of explosive tests needed for successive generations of American weapons from 23 to 6.

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© 1983 John Simpson

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Simpson, J. (1983). The United States, Britain and the Military Atom: Retrospect and Evaluation. In: The Independent Nuclear State. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17258-0_11

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