External Influences on Regime Stability in the GDR: a Linkage Analysis
For the German Democratic Republic, the linkage between international developments and the domestic political system has traditionally been an intimate one. This has been especially true with respect to the vital connection that prevails between external factors and the internal stability of communist party rule. Perhaps more than any other ruling party in East-Central Europe, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) has been dependent on outside sources of support for its political viability. At the same time, however, the external environment has cast up an array of challenges to the stability of the SED regime, at times with the paradoxical result that both stabilizing and destabilizing influences emanate from the very same sources. It is on this crucial relationship between the international environment and regime stability in the GDR that the present study focuses.
KeywordsEurope Petroleum Transportation Propa Income
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Notes and References
- 1.On Ulbricht’s perceptions, see Michael J. Sodaro, “Ulbricht’s Grand Design: Economics, Ideology, and the GDR’s Response to Detente,” World Affairs, vol. 142, no. 3 (Winter 1980 ), pp. 147–68.Google Scholar
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