Abstract
We have become accustomed over the years to thinking of weapons as falling into categories: conventional and nuclear; tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear; offensive and defensive; first and second strike, and so on. Moreover, we have envisaged that, should limited war break out in Europe, a process of escalation could set in involving greater and greater levels of destruction over wider areas involving the use of different categories of arms. Each step in the escalation process would involve crossing a ‘threshold’, the perceived most significant threshold being that between conventional and nuclear warfare1 Nerlich observed in 1978 that western ‘official thinking is still dominated by the notion of “thresholds” ’.2
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Notes
U. Nerlich, ‘The Political Choices’, New Conventional Weapons and East—West Security: Part II (London, IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 145, 1978 ) p. 13.
See, for instance, B. George and K. Pieragostini, ‘The 1980 Defence White Paper’, ADIUReport, vol. 2. no. 2, April/May 1980 (University of Sussex) p. 6.
J. Perry-Robinson, ‘Qualitative Trends in Conventional Munitions: the Vietnam War and After’ in M. Kaldor and A. Eide (eds), The World Military Order ( London: Macmillan, 1979 ).
See F. Asbeck, ‘The Militarisation of Space’, ADIUReport, vol. 2. No. 2, April—May 1980 (University of Sussex) p. 3.
US arms transfer policy towards the Arab-Israeli dispute reflects these considerations. Although ostensibly designed to promote a balance of power in the region, US policy from before 1967 was to arm Israel to the extent that it could defeat all its neighbours. As was seen in 1967 and in Israeli ‘reprisal’ policies, this could not deter Israeli attacks on Arab states: see T. Taylor, The Supply of Arms to the Middle East and United States Foreign Policy, 1950–68 (University of London, unpublished PhD thesis, 1972 ) pp. 177–9.
Y. Evron, ‘Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Proposals and Their Confidence Building Roles’ in J. Alford (ed.), The Future of Arms Control: Part III, Confidence Building Measures (London: IISS, Adelphi Paper no. 138, 1977 ).
Speech of 24 Feb. 1976, reproduced in R. J. Pranger, Detente and Defense: A Reader ( Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1977 ) p. 182.
D. B. Vought and J. R. Angolia, ‘The United States Army’ in Ray Bonds (ed.), The United States War Machine ( London: Salamander Books, 1978 ).
See, amongst other items, M. McGwire, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine’ in Survival xxn, 3 (May-June 1980 ) pp. 107–12;
N. A. Lomov: Scientific technical progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (translated and published by U.S. Air Force, 1973):
P. H. Vigor: The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 );
V. D. Sokolovskii, Military Strategy (Stanford: California, Stanford Research Institute, 1971 ).
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© 1983 William F. Gutteridge and Trevor Taylor
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Taylor, T., Dunn, D. (1983). Arms Control and Conventional Weapons. In: Gutteridge, W., Taylor, T. (eds) The Dangers of New Weapon Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17187-3_16
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