The important and far-reaching changes in China’s domestic affairs since the death of Mao Zedong have been reflected in its external relations, but not as much as might be thought at first sight. China’s leaders have adopted what they call an ‘open door’ policy towards the outside world as a vital part of their programme for modernising the country. The ‘open door’, in contrast with the more ‘closed door’ of the previous two decades, involves mainly expanded foreign economic relations but also a wide range of scientific, cultural and other exchanges with Western countries in particular. Yet with regard to power relations and security questions the changes are far less evident. These are still marked by the attempt to establish an anti-Soviet coalition combined with what might be called a subtle alignment with the United States as initiated by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai at the beginning of the 1970s.


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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    See the arguments by Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, Macmillan, 1977) pp. 16–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    For a useful discussion of the elements involved in the related concept of national interest see Joseph Frankel, The National Interest (London, Macmillan, 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    See Da Gong Bao (Hong Kong, English edition) 1 April 1982 for extract of Peng Dehuai’s autobiography in which Mao is depicted as arguing alone at a meeting in favour of intervention. See also Chou Chingwen, Ten Years of Storm: The True Story of the Communist Regime in China (Connecticut, U.S., Green Wood Press, 1960) p. 117; where he states that Mao ‘paced up and down for three days and nights before he came to the decision’.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    For an argument to that effect, see Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (London, Croom Helm, 1978) pp. 275–81.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    See the argument in J. R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate, vol. 1 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) pp. 98–100.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    See the discussion in William Wallace, Foreign Policy and the Political Process (London, Macmillan, 1971) pp. 50–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    For a challenging analysis of the factional alignments related to the conflict over the tilt to the United States in 1971, see Thomas M. Gottleib, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle (RAND Report R-1902-NA, 1977).Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    For a discussion of these differences, see Alexander Eckstein, China’s Economic Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 1977) pp. 125–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    For the classic account of these reformers who would not have thought of themselves as modernisers, see Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung Chih Restoration 1862–1874 (California, Stanford University Press, 1957).Google Scholar
  10. 11.
    See the argument in Wang Gung-wu, China and the World since 1949: The Impact of Independence Modernity and Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1979) p. 19.Google Scholar
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    See ‘Introduction’ in Stuart R. Schram (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters 1956–1971 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974) pp. 34–36.Google Scholar
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    For an argument that Chinese foreign policy after 1949 was ‘encumbered by the politics of foreign dependence’ and that it was largely ‘reactive to the (usually hostile) initiatives of external powers’, see John Gittings, The World and China 1922–1972 (London, Eyre Methuen, 1974) pp. 10–12.Google Scholar
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    Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979) pp. 1058–63.Google Scholar
  14. Strobe Talbott (trans.) The Khrushchev Memoirs, vol. 1 (London, Sphere Books, 1971) pp. 424–40; vol. 2 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977) pp. 282–343.Google Scholar
  15. 19.
    Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York, Pantheon Books, 1974) pp. 278–84.Google Scholar
  16. 20.
    See Harold P. Ford, ‘The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Problems 1957–1960’, in Raymond L. Garthoff (ed.), Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York, Praeger, 1966) pp. 100–13.Google Scholar
  17. 21.
    On the military aspects, see Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, The Purge of Lo Jui-ch’ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Plan-ping (RAND Report R-548-PR, February 1971). For my own interpretation, see ‘Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate 1965–1966’.Google Scholar
  18. in China Quarterly (no. 49, March 1972) which takes issue with the interpretations of Uri Ra’anan, ‘Peking’s Foreign Policy “Debate”, 1965–1966’ and Donald S. Zagoria, The Strategic Debate in Peking’ — both in Tang Tsou (ed.), China in Crisis vol. 2 (University of Chicago Press, 1968) pp. 23–71 and pp. 237–68 respectively.Google Scholar
  19. 23.
    The best account is still Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–61 (Princeton University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

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© Michael Yahuda 1983

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  • Michael Yahuda

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