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Abstract

The analysis of the structure of the sciences in Part One will have shown how many factors go to making up a science, how many kinds of statements there are in a scientific discourse. The important differences between a scientific and any other kind of discourse are (a) the statements in the discourse are systematically arranged and (b they are not made idly but are grounded in and tested against the facts. Now that we have seen how the sciences are constructed we are in a better position to investigate the many ways in which we determine the ultimate acceptability and satisfactoriness of scientific descriptions and scientific theories. Acceptability and satisfactoriness are of course closely related to the purposes for which we construct scientific theories and give scientific descriptions of phenomena. These purposes can be summarized as follows:
  1. (i)

    the codification and condensation of our isolated items of information about the world,

     
  2. (ii)

    the prediction of the character of the event that will occur in a new situation,

     
  3. (iii)

    the understanding of the phenomena of nature.

     

Keywords

Logical Problem Inductive Reasoning Inductive Argument Inductive Procedure Deductive Inference 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    S. Toulmin, ‘Probability’, Essays in Conceptual Analysis, ed. A. G. N. Flew, p. 165.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    H. Reichenbach, The Theory of Probability, §§87, 91.Google Scholar
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    P. Edwards, ‘Bertrand Russell’s Doubts about Induction’, Logic and Language; Series I, ed. A. G. N. Flew, Chap. IV, p. 55.Google Scholar
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    Since this chapter was written great efforts have been put into developing Popper’s ‘fallibilism’-see particularly I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Horace Romano Harré 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rom Harré
    • 1
  1. 1.Linacre CollegeOxfordUK

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