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British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805

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Part of the book series: Problems in Focus Series ((PFS))

Abstract

The British public by the autumn of 1791 was well-familiar with the topic of West Indian slavery, perhaps even growing tired of it, when on 26 October rumours raced around London that there had been a huge and gory catastrophe in the Caribbean. The campaign to abolish the slave trade was already four years old and was reaching a new climax, after being set back in the spring by news of a brief rebellion on the island of Dominica.1 Now reports began to arrive from the French colony of St Domingue of a slave revolt far greater than anything the New World had ever known. The great northern plain of St Domingue, the West Indies’ wealthiest colony and Europe’s main source of both sugar and coffee, had been devastated. Over 100,000 slaves were in revolt, and with firebrands and machetes had taken a terrible revenge on their masters. Hundreds of plantations lay in ashes. Hundreds of whites had been slaughtered, sometimes in the most grisly of circumstances. As lurid tales were told and retold in the coffee shops and counting houses of the City, the price of sugar shot sky high and stocks fell immediately by 1 per cent.2

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Notes and References

  1. W. Sypher, Guinea’s captive kings: British anti-slavery literature in the eighteenth century (Chapel Hill, 1942) pp. 19–23; T. Clarkson, History of the … abolition of the African slave trade (1808) vol. II, 210–12; R.I. and S. Wilberforce, Life of William Wilberforce (1838) vol. I, p. 296.

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  2. See D. Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution: the British occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793–98 (Oxford, 1981) ch. 9, pt 1; Annual Register, 1796, p. 66, and 1797, pp. 121–6.

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  3. The passage is cited with suitably acidic commentary in C. L. R. James, The black Jacobins (New York, 1963) pp. 226–7.

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  4. Government policy was, after allowing the expedition to sail, to remain neutral and hope for a speedy victory, as did the British planters. Even the Colonial Secretary Lord Hobart, who was an abolitionist, considered ‘Toussaint’s Black Empire’ an ‘evil’: see H. Hughes, ‘British policy towards Haiti, 1801–1805’, Canadian Historical Review, XXV 4 (1944) 398. Yet only two years before a French attempt to raise a slave rebellion in Jamaica had been betrayed by Toussaint to the British: see PRO, CO 245/1, p. 34.

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  5. None the less, Charles Fox could still chide the British in 1803 for being more concerned with the Swiss, while regarding French inhumanity in St. Domingue as being beneficial to Britain’s commercial and military interests: see D. V. Erdman (ed.), The collected works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Princeton, 1978) vol. III, pt i, p. 434 n.15.

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  6. C. Southey (ed.), The life and correspondence of Robert Southey (1850) vol. II, pp. 203–4.

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Authors

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James Walvin

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© 1982 Michael Craton, Seymour Drescher, David Eltis, Betty Fladeland, David Geggus, B. W. Higman, C. Duncan Rice, James Walvin

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Geggus, D. (1982). British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805. In: Walvin, J. (eds) Slavery and British Society 1776–1846. Problems in Focus Series. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16775-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16775-3_6

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-28074-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-16775-3

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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