Class, Inequality and the Political Order

  • R. W. Johnson


In 1965 the Left was able to mobilise only 55 per cent of the industrial working-class behind Mitterrand in his presidential run-off against De Gaulle. Nine years later no less than 73 per cent of workers supported Mitterrand on the second ballot against Giscard. The conservative working-class vote had fallen by two-fifths in less than a decade. This large and rapid shift towards more class-based political behaviour affected not merely election results but the whole tenor and content of political debate. With a quite surprising suddenness politics ceased to centre on the Algerian and constitutional crises and French grandeur and became, again, the old battleground between haves and have-nots.


Presidential Election Labour Movement Political Order French Society Social Security Contribution 
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© R. W. Johnson 1981

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  • R. W. Johnson

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