Abstract
In the previous chapter a scientific law was defined as an empirical generalisation which was explained by a scientific theory; it was thereby distinguished from a simple empirical generalisation. Examples of simple empirical generalisations are ‘All crows are black’, ‘All dogs bark’, ‘All men are mortal’. Examples of scientific laws are ‘All samples of chlorine gas are green’, ‘All heavy objects fall to the ground with an acceleration of 32 ft/sec./sec.’, ‘The pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to its volume at constant temperature’. Because laws are supported by and give support to theories, the refutation of a law is a much more important matter than the refutation of a simple empirical generalisation.
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Questions and Further Reading
R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge UP, Cambridge: 1955), ch. 1.
J. M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., New York: 1972), ch. 8, sects 3 and 6.
N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge UP, Cambridge: 1965).
C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Free Press, New York: 1965), ch. 1.
A. Pap, The ‘A Priori’in Physical Theory (Russell, New York: 1868).
K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (see 4 above), ch. 4.
K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (see 4 above), ch. 1.
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© 1979 Jennifer Trusted
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Trusted, J. (1979). The Refutation of Laws and Theories. In: The Logic of Scientific Inference. Modern Introductions to Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16154-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16154-6_6
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