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Collusive Oligopoly

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Abstract

One way of avoiding the uncertainty arising from oligopolistic interdependence is to enter into collusive agreements. There are two main types of collusion, cartels and price leadership. Both forms generally imply tacit (secret) agreements, since open collusive action is commonly illegal in most countries at present.

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Collusive Oligopoly

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© 1979 A. Koutsoyiannis

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Koutsoyiannis, A. (1979). Collusive Oligopoly. In: Modern Microeconomics. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16077-8_10

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