Picking up the Pieces: Britain’s Response to the Armistice

Abstract

Just as the hopes and ambitions of the men in Bordeaux were shaped by the mood of urgent self-examination and doubt which held France in its grip, so too were the responses of the British policy-makers an expression of the very different mood which had prevailed in London since the time of Dunkirk — one of profound relief at having, escaped from a campaign which had been viewed from the start with so little enthusiasm, and at having been freed from the continued obligation to support a crippled ally. This feeling of relief and elation was only lightly tinged with regret at the fate which had befallen France. General Brooke, for example, had deplored the decision to send the BEF back to France after Dunkirk, and made it plain to Eden before he left that he entertained no hope of success.¹ When Air Marshal Dowding heard of the Armistice, he fell to his knees and thanked God.² Even Churchill, who had been more willing than anybody else in the Cabinet to commit increasing numbers of fighters to the battle, decided finally that he had been ‘throwing snowballs into hell’.³ As early as 26 May, he had even suggested that Britain might be better off without France.⁴ Cadogan, at first sceptical, soon came round to the same view. ‘If we keep them in the fight, we’ve got to give them air protection and drain away our defences and so fall between two stools. Better to say “All right: if you can’t stick it, get out or give in: we go on alone.” ’⁵