Values

Abstract

One of the aims of this chapter is to round off the discussion of objectivity, begun with the treatment of selection in chapter iii, and continued with the examination of true or real causes (more or less fundamental explanations) in chapter v. It remains to consider objectivity worries having their source in values; or rather in a prevalent conception of valuation, inasmuch as those who are prone to these worries seem to take it for granted that value judgements are as such subjective and arbitrary. Not least among the dire effects of this assumption is its tendency to impede the recognition of differences both among value judgements and among the ways they come into or bear upon history. It is obviously impossible to attempt here even the outlines of a comprehensive account of value judgements, but it will all the same be necessary in, what follows to have regard to some of the important distinctions relating to them. In particular account will have to be taken of the distinctions: between reporting and making value judgements; between what may be termed ‘life’ and ‘intellectual’ values; and, within life values, to the distinction between the moral and the non-moral and, up to a point, distinctions within morality itself. Consideration of such broad distinctions, even at a necessarily very abstract level, will help to place valuation-based objectivity worries in their true perspective.