Foreign and Defence Policy

Abstract

The judgement which Khrushchev’s successors pronounced on his foreign and defence policy was not essentially different from their assessment of his leadership in other fields. His ‘voluntaristic and unrealistic approach to the phenomena and events of international life’ was attacked for `giving rise either to smug overconfidence or to weakness in the face of the military threat from imperialism’.¹ The military leaders denounced subjectivism in defence policy and called for greater attention to military advice and recommendations.² It was not the general objectives of Khrushchev’s policies that were disputed, but the manner in which they were pursued. He was seen to be moving too precipitately towards better relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, and with unnecessary haste towards a complete break with China. His impending visit to Bonn was cancelled, and the tone of Soviet policy towards China was changed in an unsuccessful attempt to improve relations. The new leaders endorsed the policy of détente with the United States, but evidently felt that this did not lessen the need for military strength. Khrushchev’s attempts to exploit Soviet military power for political ends — as for example in Cuba and Berlin — were condemned as adventuristic. The verdict on Khrushchev was that he had been guilty of the solecism of, power: he had pursued ends he had not the means to attain.