Britain, Germany and France, 1912–14: Flexibility and Constraint

Abstract

To what extent did Sir Edward Grey pursue a different course after the Agadir crisis? The closeness of war provided a terrible shock to many who, while speaking about war, never really contemplated it as a reality. There was a reaction in the Cabinet and in Parliament and the radical case, however overstated and indefinite as to alternatives, secured a wider hearing than in the pre-Agadir period. Some form of détente was bound to follow; the fears and pressures aroused by the crisis were too powerful to be ignored. In differing degrees, Loreburn, McKenna, Harcourt and Lloyd George were all anxious to have another try at an Anglo-German rapprochement and they were joined by Haldane who retained some of his old hopes that a bridge to Berlin might be constructed. Grey, too, shared the radical detestation of war and fear of ever-increasing military expenditure. Without being willing to abandon what he considered necessary for the safety of the nation, he did want to restore good relations with Berlin. There were also pressing reasons on the German side why Bethmann Hollweg should have once again pursued the dream of an Anglo-German agreement. The elections of 1912 represented a great victory for the Social Democrats, who with 110 deputies became the strongest party in the Reichstag. At the same time, the National Liberals and the Free Conservatives, the party of the right, were becoming increasingly restive and threw their support behind the newly created Wehrverein (Defence Association) which was demanding an enlarged army and a new army bill.