Philosophy and language
We must also grasp the nature of deliberative excellence—∊ύβovλια. — and find whether it is a sort of knowledge, or of opinion, or of skill at guessing—∊νστοχία—or something different from these in kind. Now it is not knowledge: for men do not investigate — ζητονστι—matters about which they know, whereas deliberative excellence is a sort of deliberation, and deliberating implies investigating and calculating. But deliberation is not the same as investigation: it is the investigation of a particular subject [i.e. conduct—A.F.]. Nor yet is it skill at guessing: for this operates without conscious calculation, and rapidly, whereas deliberating takes a long time. … Correctness cannot be predicated of knowledge, any more than can error, and correctness of opinion is truth (bk vi, ch. 9: 1142 a32 ff.).
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