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Editor’s Introduction

  • Colin Lyas
Chapter
Part of the Controversies in Philosophy book series (COIPHIL)

Abstract

There are at least two reasons why language has always been an intriguing object of study. First, there is the supposition that language is a distinctively human possession, one that marks us off in some way from other inhabitants of the animal kingdom. Given this supposition, it is not unnatural for there to be a belief that to achieve an understanding of language is to make a significant step towards an understanding of our own nature. Second, language has been studied for the more practical reason that many difficulties arise from its misuse. The hope here is that an understanding of language will lead to an understanding and avoidance of these difficulties.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (New York, 1966).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    J. J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York, 1966) ch. 1.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
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  4. 5.
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    A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language, First Series (Oxford, 1951).Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Limited 1971

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  • Colin Lyas

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