Materialism as a scientific hypothesis

Abstract

In discussing the logical status of the thesis that sensations are processes in the brain, J. J. C. Smart¹ contends that I was partly right and partly wrong in maintaining that this thesis could and should be interpreted as a straightforward scientific hypothesis.² He argues that in so far as the issue is between a brain-process thesis and a heart, liver, or kidney thesis the issue is empirical and can be decided by experiment. But in so far as the issue is between materialism on the one hand and epiphenomenalism, psycho-physical parallelism, interactionism, and so forth, on the other, the issue is non-empirical. I shall argue that Smart is partly right and partly wrong in maintaining that the issue between the kind of materialism which both he and I would wish to defend and the rival doctrines of epiphenomenalism, psycho-physical parallelism, interactionism, and so forth, is a non-empirical issue.